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Abstract
The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the
environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying
implementation on richer type spaces, with more higher order uncertainty.
We study the "ex post equivalence" question: when is interim implementation
on all possible type spaces equivalent to requiring ex post implementation on the
space of payo⁄ types? We show that ex post equivalence holds when the social
choice correspondence is a function and in simple quasi-linear environments. When
ex post equivalence holds, we identify how large the type space must be to obtain
the equivalence. We also show that ex post equivalence fails in general, including
in quasi-linear environments with budget balance.
For quasi-linear environments, we provide an exact characterization of when
interim implementation is possible in rich type spaces. In this environment, the
planner can fully extract players￿belief types, so the incentive constraints reduce
to conditions distinguishing types with the same beliefs about others￿types but
di⁄erent payo⁄ types.
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stephen.morris@yale.edu.￿Game theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the consequences
of trading rules that presumably are really common knowledge; it is de￿cient
to the extent it assumes other features to be common knowledge, such as one
player￿ s probability assessment about another￿ s preferences or information.
I foresee the progress of game theory as depending on successive reductions
in the base of common knowledge required to conduct useful analyses of
practical problems. Only by repeated weakening of common knowledge as-
sumptions will the theory approximate reality.￿ Wilson (1987)
1. Introduction
The theory of mechanism design helps us understand institutions ranging from simple
trading rules to political constitutions. We can understand institutions as the solution
to a well de￿ned planner￿ s problem of achieving some objective or maximizing some
utility function subject to incentive constraints. But a common criticism of mechanism
design theory is that the optimal mechanisms solving the well de￿ned planner￿ s problem
seem unreasonably complicated. Researchers have often therefore restricted attention
to mechanisms that are "more robust", or less sensitive to the assumed structure of
the environment.1 However, if the optimal solution to the planner￿ s problem is too
complicated or sensitive to be used in practice, it is presumably because the original
description of the planner￿ s problem was itself ￿ awed. We would like to see if improved
modelling of the planner￿ s problem endogenously generates the "robust" features of
mechanisms that researchers have been tempted to assume.
As suggested by Robert Wilson in the above quote, the problem is that we make
too many implicit common knowledge assumptions in our description of the planner￿ s
problem.2 The modelling strategy must be to ￿rst make explicit the implicit common
knowledge assumptions, and then weaken them. The approach to modelling incomplete
information introduced by Harsanyi (1967/1968) and formalized by Mertens and Zamir
(1985) is ideally suited to this task. In fact, Harsanyi￿ s work was intended to address the
then prevailing criticism of game theory that the very description of a game embodied
common knowledge assumptions that could never prevail in practise. Harsanyi argued
1Discussions of this issue are an old theme in the mechanism design literature. Hurwicz (1972)
discussed the need for "nonparametric" mechanisms (independent of parameters of the model). Wilson
(1985) states that a desirable property of a trading rule is that it ￿does not rely on features of the
agents￿common knowledge, such as their probability assessments.￿Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) ￿seek
auction rules that are independent of the details - such as functional forms or distribution of signals -
of any particular application and that work well in a broad range of circumstances￿ .
2An important paper of Neeman (2001) shows how rich type spaces can be used to relax implicit
common knowledge assumptions in a mechanism design context. For other approaches to formalizing
robust mechanism design, see Duggan and Roberts (1997), Eliaz (2002) and Lopomo (1998, 2000).
2that by allowing an agent￿ s type to include his beliefs about the strategic environment,
his beliefs about other agents￿beliefs, and so on, any environment of incomplete in-
formation could be captured by a type space. With this su¢ ciently large type space
(including all possible beliefs and higher order beliefs), it is true (tautologically) that
there is common knowledge among the agents of each agent￿ s type space and each type￿ s
beliefs over the types of other agents. However, as a practical matter, applied economic
analysis tends to assume much smaller type spaces than the universal type space, and
yet maintain the assumption that there is common knowledge among the agents of each
agent￿ s type spaces and each type￿ s beliefs over the types of other agents. In the small
type space case, this is a very substantive restriction. There has been remarkably lit-
tle work since Harsanyi checking whether analysis of incomplete information games in
economics is robust to the implicit common knowledge assumptions built into small
type spaces.3 We will investigate the importance of these implicit common knowledge
assumptions in the context of mechanism design.4
Formally, we ￿x a payo⁄environment, specifying a set of payo⁄types for each agent,
a set of outcomes, utility functions for each agent and a social choice correspondence
(SCC) mapping payo⁄ type pro￿les into sets of acceptable outcomes. The planner
(partially) implements5 the social choice correspondence if there exists a mechanism
and an equilibrium strategy pro￿le of that mechanism such that equilibrium outcomes
for every payo⁄ type pro￿le are acceptable according to the SCC.6 While holding ￿xed
this environment, we can construct many type spaces, where an agent￿ s type speci￿es
both his payo⁄ type and his belief about other agents￿types. Crucially, there may be
many types of an agent with the same payo⁄type. The larger the type space, the harder
it will be to implement the social choice correspondence, and so the more ￿robust￿the
resulting mechanism will be. The smallest type space we can work with is the ￿naive
type space,￿where we set the possible types of each agent equal to the set of payo⁄
types, and assume a common knowledge prior over this type space. This is the usual
exercise performed in the mechanism design literature. The largest type space we can
work with is the union of all possible type spaces that could have arisen from the payo⁄
environment. This is equivalent to working with a ￿universal type space,￿in the sense
of Mertens and Zamir (1985). There are many interesting type spaces in between the
naive type space and the universal type space that are also interesting to study. For
3Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003), Morris and Shin (2003).
4Neeman (2001) argued that small type space assumptions are especially important in the full surplus
extraction results of Cremer and McLean (1985).
5"Partial implementation" is sometimes called "truthful implementation" or "incentive compatible
implementation." Since we look exclusively at partial implementation in this paper, we will write "im-
plement" instead of "partially implement".
6In a companion paper, Bergemann and Morris (2002), we use the framework of this paper to look
at full implementation, i.e., requiring that every equilibrium delivers an outcome consistent with the
social choice correspondence.
3example, we can look at the union of all naive type spaces (so that the agents have
common knowledge of a prior over payo⁄ types but the mechanism designer does not);
and we can look at the union of all type spaces where the common prior assumption
holds.
For these di⁄erent type spaces, we then ask how conditions for interim implementa-
tion compare with stronger equilibrium notions on the original type space of payo⁄types.
We show that for social choice functions in general environments and for social choice
correspondences in quasi-linear environments without balanced budget constraints there
is a strong ex post equivalence result: interim implementation on all naive type spaces
is equivalent to interim implementation on all type spaces which is equivalent to ex post
implementation. However, these strong equivalences do not hold in general. We show
by example that it is sometimes possible to interim implement on all type spaces, but
not possible to ex post implement; and it is sometimes possible to interim implement
on all naive type spaces, but not possible to interim implement on all type spaces.
Motivated by this gap, we suggest a weaker notion of ex post implementation, namely
augmented ex post implementation, for which equivalence can be show to hold in gen-
eral. Quasi-linear environments with budget balance constraints are an interesting class
of models where the strong equivalence does not hold in general. We illustrate this by
means of an example and then provide su¢ cient conditions for equivalence result. For
example, there is an equivalence between ex post implementation and interim imple-
mentation on all type spaces if either there are only two agents, or if each agent has at
most two payo⁄ types.
Finally, for quasi-linear environments without budget balance constraints, we are
able to provide an exact characterization of when interim implementation is possible
on arbitrary type spaces. An agent￿ s beliefs about other agents￿types can always be
fully extracted by standard arguments (Cremer and McLean (1985)), so incentive com-
patibility conditions reduce to distinguishing types with the same beliefs about others￿
types but di⁄erent payo⁄ types. This result parallels an observation of Neeman (2001)
for revenue maximizing mechanisms. However, belief types may exhibit linear depen-
dence, so a revenue maximizing seller might have to trade o⁄ the gains to extracting
belief types against the costs of inducing agents to report their belief types truthfully.
However, when the planner is only interested in e¢ ciency (and does not care about
transfers), any types with di⁄erent beliefs can be distinguish at no cost. The interim
implementation conditions we describe are automatically satis￿ed for a "generic" choice
of prior on a ￿xed ￿nite type space. However, we discuss problems with the standard
notion of genericity and suggest that our conditions might be hard to satisfy in practise
without unreasonable common knowledge assumptions.
In private values environments, ex post implementation is equivalent to dominant
strategies implementation. Our positive and negative results all have counterparts in
private values environments, and thus our results give su¢ cient conditions for (and
4counterexamples to) the equivalence of dominant strategies and Bayesian implementa-
tion. There was an early formal and informal debate on the relation between Bayesian
and dominant strategies implementation. Consider the case where the prior on a ￿xed
type space is common knowledge among the agents, but is not known to the planner. If
we ask that the same direct mechanism Bayesian implement an SCC for every prior on
that ￿xed type space, this is equivalent to dominant strategies implementation (Das-
gupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979), Ledyard (1978, 1979) and Groves and Ledyard
(1987)). But if the prior were truly common knowledge among the agents, then this
particular weakening of the common knowledge assumptions is relatively easy to resolve,
as information that is non-exclusive in the sense of Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986),
can always be truthfully elicited from the agents in an interim equilibrium.7 But if this
easily extracted information is used in designing the mechanism, then we lose the argu-
ment showing the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategies implementation. Our
results identify some cases where Bayesian implementation for all priors implies dom-
inant strategies implementation, even when the planner knows (or can easily extract)
the true prior on a ￿xed type space. But in other cases, we show that more interest-
ing relaxations of common knowledge assumptions are required to show the necessity
of dominant strategies implementation. And in yet other cases, Bayesian implementa-
tion is possible on all type spaces even though dominant strategies implementation is
impossible.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the setup, introduces
the type spaces and provides the equilibrium notions. In Section 3 we present in some
detail three examples which illustrate the role of type spaces in the implementation
problem and point to the complex relationship between ex post implementation on
the naive type space and interim implementation on larger type spaces. In Section 4
we present equivalence results for general social choice environments, also introducing
our notion of augmented ex post implementability. The analysis specializes to the
quasi-linear environment with and without balanced budget in Section 5. The interim
implementability on arbitrary type spaces in the quasi-linear model is investigated in
Section 6. We conclude with a discussion of further issues in Section 7.
2. Setup
2.1. Payo⁄ Environment
We consider a ￿nite set of agents I = f1;2;:::;Ig. Agent i￿ s payo⁄ type is ￿i 2 ￿i, where
￿i is a ￿nite set. We write ￿ 2 ￿ = ￿1 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿I. There is a set of outcomes A. Each
agent has utility function ui : A ￿ ￿ ! R. A social correspondence F : ￿ ! 2A￿
;. If
7See Choi and Kim (1999) for a formal use of this "folk" argument.
5the true payo⁄ type pro￿le is ￿, the planner would like the outcome to be an element
of F (￿).
Throughout the paper, this environment is ￿xed and informally understood to be
common knowledge. Note that we allow for interdependent types - one agent￿ s payo⁄
from a given outcome depends on other agents￿payo⁄ types. Also note that the payo⁄
type pro￿le is understood to contain all information that is relevant to whether the
planner achieves his objective or not. For example, we do not allow the planner to trade
o⁄what happens in one state with what happens in another state. For the latter reason,
this setup is somewhat restrictive. However, it incorporates many classic problems such
as the e¢ cient allocation of an object or the e¢ cient choice of public good.
2.2. Type Spaces
While maintaining that the above payo⁄environment is common knowledge, we want to
allow for agents to have all possible beliefs and higher order beliefs about other agents￿
types. A ￿ exible framework for modelling such beliefs and higher order beliefs are type
spaces.







Agent i￿ s type is ti 2 Ti. A type of agent i must include a description of his payo⁄ type.
Thus there is a function
b ￿i : Ti ! ￿i,
with b ￿i (ti) being agent i￿ s payo⁄ type when his type is ti. A type of agent i must also
include a description of his beliefs about the types of the other agent. Write ￿(Z) for
the space of probability measures on the Borel ￿eld of a measurable space Z, there is a
function
b ￿i : Ti ! ￿(T￿i),
with b ￿i (ti) being agent i￿ s belief type when his type is ti. Thus b ￿i (ti)[E] is the prob-
ability that type ti of agent i assigns to other agents￿types, t￿i, being an element of
a measurable set E ￿ T￿i. In the special case where each Tj is ￿nite, we will abuse
notation slightly by writing b ￿i (ti)[t￿i] for the probability that type ti of agent i assigns
to other agents having types t￿i.
Sometimes, we will be interested only in the beliefs of a type over the payo⁄ types
of other agents. Thus
b  i : Ti ! ￿(￿￿i)
6represent agent i￿ s beliefs about other agents￿payo⁄ types, i.e.,
b  i (ti)[￿￿i] =
X
ft￿i:b ￿￿i(t￿i)=￿￿ig
b ￿i (ti)[t￿i]. (2.1)
2.3. Properties of Type Spaces
Global restrictions on the type space represent common knowledge assumptions among
the agents. Some key properties are the following:
￿ Type Space T is ￿naive￿if each Ti = ￿i and each b ￿i is the identity map.
￿ Type Space T is ￿nite if each Ti is ￿nite.
￿ Finite Type Space T has full support if b ￿i (ti)[t￿i] > 0 for all i and t.
￿ Finite Type Space T satis￿es the common prior assumption (with prior p) if there
exists p 2 ￿(T) such that
X
t￿i2T￿i
p(ti;t￿i) > 0 for all i and ti
and










Now a canonical approach in the mechanism design literature is to restrict attention
to a naive full support common prior type space. Thus it is assumed that there is
common knowledge among the agents of a common prior over the payo⁄ types. This
assumption is not without loss of generality. The naive type space can be thought of
the smallest type space embedding the payo⁄ environment described above.
At the other extreme is the "universal type space" which allows for all possible
beliefs or higher order beliefs about payo⁄ types. This universal type space contains all
possible type spaces that could have been constructed from the payo⁄environment. The
existence of such a universal type space was proved constructively under a variety of
topological assumptions by Mertens and Zamir (1985), Brandenburger and Dekel (1993)
and other authors. The constructive argument fails without topological assumptions,
but Heifetz and Samet (1998) showed the existence of a universal type space with no
topological assumptions, i.e. a type space containing all type spaces of the measure
7theoretic form described above. For the purpose of this paper, it su¢ ces to conceive the
universal type space as the union of all type spaces we could possibly construct.8
As we relax implicit common knowledge assumptions in the standard mechanism
design approach, we go from a naive full support common prior type space to the union
of all type spaces. There are also some important intermediate type spaces; we will
mention two here.
It is sometimes assumed that there is a true full support prior p over the payo⁄types,
but the planner does not know what it is. (The complete information implementation
literature can be subsumed in this speci￿cation.) We can represent this as follows. The
type space is
Ti = ￿++ (￿) ￿ ￿i;
with a typical element
ti = (pi;￿i).
The payo⁄ type is de￿ned in the natural way:
b ￿i (pi;￿i) = ￿i:
The belief type is de￿ned on the assumption that there is common knowledge of the







pi (￿￿i j￿i), if pj = pi for all j 6= i;
0, otherwise.
We will refer to this as the union of all full support common prior type spaces.
A second example of an intermediate type space is the union of all common prior
type spaces. In the universal type space, there is no requirement that agents￿beliefs be
derived from some common prior. However, the common prior is an important economic
assumption and it will sometime be interesting to look at the union of all type spaces
satisfying the common prior assumption, or, equivalently, the subset of the universal
type space where the common prior assumption holds.
8In an earlier version of this paper, we described an explicit construction of the universal type
space for our environment, along the lines of Mertens and Zamir (1985) (see also Neeman (2001)). A
slight variation in the construction arises from the product structure of the payo⁄ type pro￿les and
the maintained assumption that it is common knowledge that each agent knows his true payo⁄ type.
The union of all type spaces is potentially larger than this constructed space for two reasons. First,
the constructed universal type space uses (and needs) topological assumptions on the underlying space.
Second, it is possible to add types with di⁄erent beliefs over others￿types but identical beliefs and higher
order beliefs about payo⁄ types. Neither of these two di⁄erences matters for the positive or negative
results we report in this paper.
82.4. Solution Concepts
Fix a payo⁄ environment and a type space T . A mechanism speci￿es a message set
for each agent and a mapping from message pro￿les to outcomes. Social choice corre-
spondence F is interim implementable if there exists a mechanism and an interim (or
Bayesian) equilibrium of that mechanism such that outcomes are consistent with F.
However, by the revelation principle, we can restrict attention to truth-telling equilibria
of direct mechanisms.9 A direct mechanism is a function f : T ! A.





















for all i, t 2 T and t0
i 2 Ti.
The notion of interim incentive compatibility is often referred to as Bayesian incen-
tive compatibility. We use the former terminology as there need not be a common prior
on the type space.
De￿nition 2.2. A direct mechanism f : T ! A on T achieves F if




for all t 2 T.
It should be emphasized that a direct mechanism f can prescribe varying allocations
for a given payo⁄pro￿le ￿ as di⁄erent types, t and t0, may have an identical payo⁄pro￿le
￿ = b ￿(t) = b ￿(t0).
De￿nition 2.3. A social choice correspondence F is interim implementable on T if
there exists f : T ! A such that f is interim incentive compatible on T and f achieves
F.
We will be interested in comparing interim implementation with the stronger solution
concept of ex post implementation. Ex post implementation uses the stronger solution
concept of ex post equilibrium for incomplete information games.10 By the revelation
principle, it is again enough to verify ex post incentive compatibility.
9See Myerson (1991), Chapter 6.
10Ex post incentive compatibility was discussed as "uniform incentive compatibility" by Holmstrom
and Myerson (1983). Ex post equilibrium is increasingly studied in game theory (see Kalai (2002))
and is often used in mechanism design as a more robust solution concept (Cremer and McLean (1985),
Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Perry and Reny (2002)).
9De￿nition 2.4. A direct mechanism f : ￿ ! A is ex post incentive compatible if, for
all i and ￿ 2 ￿,











If there are private values (i.e., each ui (a;￿) depends on ￿ only through ￿i), then ex
post incentive compatibility is equivalent to dominant strategies incentive compatibility.
De￿nition 2.5. A direct mechanism f : ￿ ! A is dominant strategies incentive com-
patible if, for all i and ￿ 2 ￿,











De￿nition 2.6. A social choice correspondence F is ex post implementable if there
exists f : ￿ ! A such that f is ex post incentive compatible and
f (￿) 2 F (￿)
for all ￿ 2 ￿.
2.5. Questions
For a ￿xed social choice correspondence F, we can ask the "ex post equivalence" ques-
tion:
￿ when is ex post implementability of F equivalent to interim implementability on
all type spaces?
We will provide a number of su¢ cient conditions for ex post equivalence, but in
examples 1 and 2 in the next section, F is not ex post implementable but is interim
implementable on any type space.
When ex post equivalence holds, we can ask how big the type space must be in
order for interim implementability to be equivalent to ex post implementability? In
particular, what is the relation between the following questions:
￿ is F interim implementable on all full support common prior naive type spaces?
￿ is F interim implementable on all common prior naive type spaces?
￿ is F interim implementable on all common prior type spaces?
10￿ is F interim implementable on all type spaces?
For the results in this paper, full support and common prior assumptions are not
important.11 However, the naive type space restriction is important. In example 3 in
the next section, it is possible to interim implement on any naive type space but not all
type spaces.
3. Examples
This section presents three examples illustrating the relationship between interim im-
plementation on di⁄erent type spaces and ex post implementation.
The ￿rst two examples exhibit social choice correspondences that are interim imple-
mentable on all type spaces, but are not ex post implementable. The ￿rst example is
very simple, but relies on (i) a restriction to deterministic allocations, (ii) a social choice
correspondence that depends on only one agent￿ s payo⁄ type; and (iii) interdependent
types. In the second example, we show how to dispense with all three features. Since
this example has private values, we thus have an example where dominant strategies
implementation is impossible but interim implementation is possible on any type space.
The third example exhibits a social choice correspondence that is interim imple-
mentable on all naive type spaces (with or without the common prior) but is not interim
implementable on all type spaces.
3.1. F is Interim Implementable on All Type Spaces but not Ex Post Imple-
mentable










. There are three possible allocations: A = fa;b;cg. The payo⁄s of
the two agents are given by the following tables (each box describes agent 1￿ s payo⁄,






















11However, the full support assumption is important when we look at full implementation and the
common prior assumption is important when we look at revenue maximization.
11These choices are maximizers of the sum of agents￿utility. The key feature of this
example is that the agents agree about the optimal choice when agent 1 is type ￿0
1;
when agent 1 is type ￿1, they agree that it is optimal to choose either a or b. But 1
prefers a when 2￿ s type is ￿2, while 2 prefers a when his type is ￿0
2.
We now show - by contradiction - that this correspondence is not ex post imple-
















. But in order for
type ￿1 to have an incentive to tell the truth when he is sure that agent 2 is type ￿2,
we must have a chosen at pro￿le (￿1;￿2); and in order for type ￿1 to have incentive to
tell the truth when he is sure that agent 2 is type ￿0










both types of agent 2 will have an incentive to misreport their types when they are sure
that agent 1 is type ￿1.
However, the correspondence is interim implementable on any type space using the
very simple mechanism of letting agent 1 pick the outcome. There is always an equilib-
rium of this mechanism where agent 1 will pick outcome a if his type is ￿1 and he assigns
probability at least 1
2 to the other agent being type ￿2; agent 1 will pick outcome b if
his type is ￿1 and he assigns probability less than 1
2 to the other agent being type ￿2;
and agent 1 will pick outcome c if his type is ￿0
1. By allowing the mechanism to depend
on agent 1￿ s beliefs about agent 2￿ s type (something the planner does not care about
intrinsically), the planner is able to relax incentive constraints that he cares about.
The failure of ex post implementation in this example relied on the assumption that
only pure outcomes were chosen. This restriction can easily be dropped at the expense
of adding a third payo⁄type for agent 1, so that the binding ex post incentive constraint
for agent 1 is with a di⁄erent type and outcome depending on 2￿ s type. The example also
had the social choice correspondence depending only on agent 1￿ s payo⁄ type and had
interdependent values. We can mechanically change these two assumptions by letting
the planner want di⁄erent outcomes depending on agent 2￿ s type. Now instead of having
agent 1￿ s utility depend on agent 2￿ s type, it can depend on the planner￿ s re￿ned choice.












. There are eight
possible pure allocations, fa;b;c;d;a0;b0;c0;d0g, and lotteries are allowed,
so A = ￿(fa;b;c;d;a0;b0;c0;d0g). The private value payo⁄s of agent 1 are given by the
following table:
u1 a b c d a0 b0 c0 d0
￿1 1 ￿1 ￿1 1
3 ￿1 1 1
3 ￿1
￿0
1 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0
￿00
1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3
12The private value payo⁄s of agent 2 are given by the following table:
u2 a b c d a0 b0 c0 d0
￿2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0
￿0
2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0









We now show - by contradiction - that this correspondence is not ex post implementable.
Let p be the probability that a is chosen at pro￿le (￿1;￿2) and let p0 be the probability





. In order for type ￿1 to have an incentive to tell the
truth (and not report himself to be type ￿00
1) when he is sure that agent 2 is type ￿2, we
must have









In order for type ￿1 to have an incentive to tell the truth (and not report himself to be
type ￿0
1) when he is sure that agent 2 is type ￿0













But in order for agent 2 to have an incentive to tell the truth when he is type ￿2 and
he is sure that agent 1 is type ￿1, we must have





p0 ￿ p. (3.4)
However, (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) generate a contradiction, so ex post implementation is
not possible.
But it is straightforward to implement on any interim type space. Consider the
following indirect mechanism for any arbitrary type space where individual 1 chooses


























There is always an equilibrium where type ￿1 of agent 1 sends message m1
1 if he believes
agent 2 is type ￿2 with probability at least 1
2 and message m2
1 if he believes agent 2
is type ￿2 with probability less than 1
2; type ￿0
1 always sends message m3
1; and type ￿00
1
always sends message m4
1. Type ￿2 of agent 2 sends message m1
2 and type ￿2 sends
message m2
2.
This private values example has the feature that dominant strategies implementation
is impossible but interim implementation is possible on any type space, and seems to
be the ￿rst example in the literature noting this possibility.12
As we will see in the next section, a necessary feature of the example is that we have
a social choice correspondence (not function) that we are trying to implement. In the
example, it was further key that there were aspects of the allocation that the planner did
not care about but the agents did. In the example, this may look a little contrived but
note that this a natural feature of quasi-linear environments where the planner wants to
maximize the total welfare of agents. We will later present a quasi-linear utility example
that delivers the same features as this example (Example 4).
3.2. F is Interim Implementable on All Naive Type Spaces but not Interim
Implementable on All Type Spaces
EXAMPLE 3. This example has two agents, denoted by 1 and 2. Agent 1 has three














The set of allocations is given by fa;b;c;dg and each allocation can carry either the
name of agent 1 or agent 2. The set of feasible deterministic allocations is therefore
given by
A = fa1;a2;b1;b2;c1;c2;d1;d2g
and we shall allow for lotteries over these deterministic allocations. Each agent receives
utility from the allocation and from the name of the allocation. The payo⁄s before the
naming decision are given by:
12It is often noted that in public good problems with budget balance, dominant strategies imple-
mentation is impossible while Bayesian implementation is possible. However, the positive Bayesian
implementation results (d￿ Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) and d￿ Aspremont, Cremer and Gerard-






































Each agent attaches an additional utility of 1 to the allocation bearing its name and
conversely a disutility of ￿1 to the allocation bearing the name of the opponent. The
additional naming decision on the ￿nal utility acts like a zero net transferable utility
for the social problem.
The social choice correspondence F which maximizes the sum of the individual





1 a1; a2 a1; a2
￿2
1 b1; b2 c1; c2
￿3
1 d1; d2 d1; d2
(3.6)
With respect to the social choice correspondence F, we next make a few observations
regarding the ex post incentive constraints for truthtelling. Starting with agent 2 we
note that the e¢ cient allocation always has a value 2, whereas every ine¢ cient allocation
has a value 0. In consequence, for all possible naming decisions, agent 2 will never have
an incentive to misreport in order to generate a di⁄erent allocation, but only in order to
induce a di⁄erent naming decision. As for agent 1, he values most alternatives in most
states with 0, with a few exceptions. The negative entries ￿3 and ￿4 guarantee that
he will not have incentive to misreport independent of the naming decision; and the
positive valuation, 1, will require di⁄erential naming decisions to guarantee incentive
compatibility.
First, we show that the social choice correspondence F is interim implementable by
some selection f 2 F on any naive type space. If type ￿2
1 assigns probability at least 1
2
to the other agent being type ￿1












We verify the interim incentive compatibility conditions for the social choice function
f. We ￿rst observe that all the ex post incentive constraints hold except for agent 1 at
type pro￿le ￿2
1￿2
2, where he has a pro￿table deviation by misreporting himself to be of
15type ￿1
1. Suppose then that type ￿2
1 assigns probability p to the other agent being type
￿1
2. His expected payo⁄ to truth-telling, taking into account the naming decision, is
p(1) + (1 ￿ p)(￿1),
while his expected payo⁄ to mis-reporting type ￿1
1 is
p(￿4 + 1) + (1 ￿ p)(1 + 1).
Thus truth-telling is optimal as long as






Conversely, if type ￿2
1 assigns probability less than 1
2 to the other agent being type
￿1











The social choice functions f and f0 di⁄er in that all the naming decisions are reversed
from f to f0. Again, we ￿nd that all ex post incentive constraints hold except for agent
1 at type pro￿le ￿2
1￿1
2, where he has a pro￿table deviation by misreporting himself to
be of type ￿3
1. Suppose then that type ￿2
1 assigns probability p to the other agent being
type ￿1
2. His expected payo⁄ to truth-telling is
p(￿1) + (1 ￿ p)(1),
while his expected payo⁄ to mis-reporting type ￿3
1 is
p(1 + 1) + (1 ￿ p)(￿4 + 1).
Thus truth-telling is optimal as long as






16It follows from the inequalities (3.8) and (3.10) that if either p is large or if p is large,
there is no problem interim implementing F.
However, on richer type spaces than the naive type space, there may be many types
with payo⁄ type ￿2
1, some of whom are sure that the other agent is type ￿1
2 while
others are sure that he is type ￿2
2. That is the idea behind the following example of
a ￿complete information￿ type space where F cannot be interim implemented. We















6 0 0 0 0 ￿2
1
t3
1 0 0 1
6 0 0 0 ￿3
1
t4
1 0 0 0 1
6 0 0 ￿3
1
t5














Thus there are six types for each agent, tk
1 and tl
2. The entries in the cell describe
the probabilities of the common prior, which puts all probability mass on the diagonal.
The payo⁄ type corresponding to each type appears at the end of the row/column
corresponding to that type. Thus, for example, type t3
1 of agent 1 has payo⁄ type ￿3
1
and believes that agent 2 has a payo⁄ type ￿1
2 with probability one. It is in this sense,
that we speak of complete information. We require that F is implemented even at
￿impossible￿(zero probability) type pro￿les, but we could clearly adapt the example to
have small probabilities o⁄ the diagonal.
Our impossibility argument will depend only on what happens at twelve critical type
pro￿les: the diagonal pro￿les and the type pro￿les where agent 1 claims to be one type
higher and agent 2 claims to be one type lower. In the next table, we note which pair









1 fa1;a2g fa1;a2g ￿1
1
t2
1 fb1;b2g fb1;b2g ￿2
1
t3
1 fd1;d2g fd1;d2g ￿3
1
t4
1 fd1;d2g fd1;d2g ￿3
1
t5
1 fc1;c2g fc1;c2g ￿2
1
t6









We observe that the incentive constraints for agent 1 and agent 2 form jointly a cycle
through the type space. As we mentioned in the beginning of the example, we allow
17for random allocations. Consequently we write pkl for the probability of the naming







constraints corresponding to types tk
1 mis-reporting to be type tk+1
1 (modulo 6) imply
(for k = 1;2;::;6 respectively):
(1)p11 + (￿1)(1 ￿ p11) ￿ (1)p21 + (￿1)(1 ￿ p21)
(1)p22 + (￿1)(1 ￿ p22) ￿ (1 + 1)p32 + (1 ￿ 1)(1 ￿ p32)
(1)p33 + (￿1)(1 ￿ p33) ￿ (1)p43 + (￿1)(1 ￿ p43) (3.11)
(1)p44 + (￿1)(1 ￿ p44) ￿ (1)p54 + (￿1)(1 ￿ p54)
(1)p55 + (￿1)(1 ￿ p55) ￿ (1 + 1)p65 + (1 ￿ 1)(1 ￿ p65)
(1)p66 + (￿1)(1 ￿ p66) ￿ (1)p16 + (￿1)(1 ￿ p16)
The incentive constraints corresponding to types tl
2 mis-reporting to be type tl￿1
2 imply
(for l = 1;2;::;6 respectively):
(2 ￿ 1)p11 + (2 + 1)(1 ￿ p11) ￿ (2 ￿ 1)p16 + (2 + 1)(1 ￿ p16)
(2 ￿ 1)p22 + (2 + 1)(1 ￿ p22) ￿ (2 ￿ 1)p21 + (2 + 1)(1 ￿ p21)
(2 ￿ 1)p33 + (2 + 1)(1 ￿ p33) ￿ (2 ￿ 1)p32 + (2 + 1)(1 ￿ p32) (3.12)
(2 ￿ 1)p44 + (2 + 1)(1 ￿ p44) ￿ (2 ￿ 1)p43 + (2 + 1)(1 ￿ p43)
(2 ￿ 1)p55 + (2 + 1)(1 ￿ p55) ￿ (2 ￿ 1)p54 + (2 + 1)(1 ￿ p54)
(2 ￿ 1)p66 + (2 + 1)(1 ￿ p66) ￿ (2 ￿ 1)p65 + (2 + 1)(1 ￿ p65)
The inequalities (3.11) and (3.12) have a very simply structure. With very few ex-
ceptions, the payo⁄s appearing on the lhs and rhs of the inequalities are identical and
only the probability weights di⁄er. These inequalities are generated either by true and
misreported types which induce only di⁄erent naming decision but identical allocational
decisions or di⁄erent allocation decisions over which the agent is indi⁄erent. The ex-
ceptions are the second and ￿fth inequality of agent 1, where a misreported type also
leads to a di⁄erent allocational decision. Re-arranging the inequalities, we obtain
0 ￿ p21 ￿ p11; 0 ￿ p11 ￿ p61
￿1
2 ￿ p32 ￿ p22; 0 ￿ p22 ￿ p21
0 ￿ p43 ￿ p33; 0 ￿ p33 ￿ p32
0 ￿ p54 ￿ p44; 0 ￿ p44 ￿ p43
￿1
2 ￿ p65 ￿ p55; 0 ￿ p55 ￿ p54
0 ￿ p16 ￿ p66; 0 ￿ p66 ￿ p65
When we sum these twelve constraints, the probabilities on the right hand side of the
inequalities cancel out and we are left with the desired contradiction for any arbitrary
18choice of probabilities, namely ￿1 ￿ 0. The probabilities cancelled out because the set
of incentive constraints for agent 1 and agent 2 formed jointly a cycle through the type
space.
4. Ex Post Equivalence Results for General Environments
Following the initial set of examples, we now present general results about the rela-
tionship between ex post implementability and interim implementability on larger type
spaces. As suggested by the examples, the relationship between these implementation
notions will depend on the nature of the implementation problem as represented by the
social choice correspondence F. The ￿rst result is an immediate implication from the
de￿nition of ex post equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1. If F is ex post implementable, then F is interim implementable on
any type space.
PROOF: If F is ex post implementable, then by hypothesis there exists f￿ : ￿ ! A
with f￿ (￿) 2 F (￿) for all ￿, such that for all i, all ￿ and all ￿0
i:








Consider then an arbitrary type space T and the direct mechanism f : T ! A with
























































b ￿i (ti);b ￿￿i (t￿i)
￿￿
db ￿i (ti):
But by hypothesis of ex post implementability, truthtelling is a best response for every
possible pro￿le ￿￿i, and thus it remains a best response for arbitrary expectations over
￿￿i. ￿
While Examples 1 and 2 in the previous section showed that the converse does not
always hold, we can identify an important class of problems for which the equivalence
can be established.
19Proposition 4.2. If F is single valued and F is interim implementable on every full
support common prior naive type space T , then F is ex post implementable.
PROOF: Suppose therefore that the social choice function is not ex-post implementable,
then there exists a payo⁄ type pro￿le ￿, an agent i and a pro￿table deviation ￿0
i 6= ￿i
such that










But now consider the naive type space with full support common prior p. One interim












































But this constraint will be violated if the full support prior p puts probability su¢ ciently
close to 1 on ￿. ￿
This immediately implies the following strong equivalence result.
Proposition 4.3. If F is single valued, then the following are equivalent:
1. F is interim implementable on all type spaces;
2. F is interim implementable on all common prior type spaces;
3. F is interim implementable on all common prior naive type spaces;
4. F is interim implementable on all common prior full support naive type spaces;
5. F is ex post implementable.
PROOF. (1) ) (2) ) (3) ) (4) all follow by de￿nition. In each case, we are asking
for interim implementation on a smaller type space. By Proposition 4.2, (4) ) (5). By
Proposition 4.1, (5) ) (1). ￿
The argument here is straightforward. As long as we pin down what the mechanism
does as a function of payo⁄ types, then we can manipulate beliefs so that a failure
of ex post incentive compatibility can be translated into a failure of interim incentive
compatiblity. The logic of this argument goes back to Ledyard (1978, 1979) and Das-
gupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979). If F is single-valued and F is implemented, it is
true without loss of generality that any direct mechanism must depend only on payo⁄
types. If F is a fat correspondence, and we restrict the planner to use a mechanism that
depends only on payo⁄ types, then the ex post equivalence results will go through. But
if F is a fat correspondence, this assumption is with loss of generality. As we saw in
20examples 1 and 2, allowing the mechanism to depend on belief types may relax interim
incentive constraints. In particular, if there happens to be common knowledge among
the agents of a common prior on the naive type space, the planner might want to make
the mechanism sensitive to the prior.
The gap between ex post and interim implementability in the general case of a corre-
spondence leaves open the possibility that a weaker notion of ex post implementability
could lead to an equivalence result. We introduce this weaker notion by allowing each
agent to report a message mi 2 Mi besides his payo⁄ type. More precisely, an aug-
mented direct mechanism is a game where each agent i reports a payo⁄ type ￿i and in
addition reports a message mi 2 Mi. Let
M￿
i = f(￿i;mi) : ￿i 2 ￿i;mi 2 Mig
be the set of extended reports which can be sent by agent i. Thus an augmented
mechanism is parameterized by:
M￿ = M￿
1 ￿ ::: ￿ M￿
I .
We ￿rst de￿ne the notion of augmented ex post implementability, where f is allowed to
depend on M￿, or f : M￿ ! A.
De￿nition 4.4. A social choice rule f : M￿ ! A is augmented ex post incentive






























De￿nition 4.5. A social choice correspondence F is augmented ex post implementable
if there exists M￿ and f : M￿ ! A such that f is augmented ex post incentive compat-
ible and
f (￿;m) 2 F (￿)
for all (￿;m) 2 M￿.
The notion of augmented ex post implementability requires that each agent i has
a best response for every possible distribution over M￿
￿i which involves reporting his
payo⁄ type truthfully. In the special case where each Mi is a singleton, the notion
of augmented ex post implementability reduces to ex post implementability. If Mi is
a singleton, then the condition (4.1) simply states that truthtelling is a best response
under the selection f 2 F for every possible distribution over the payo⁄ types ￿￿i of
21the remaining agents. It is then su¢ cient to evoke the equivalence result in Proposition
4.2 to argue that the two notions, ex post and augmented ex post implementability,
coincide.
Proposition 4.6. If F is interim implementable on every T , then F is augmented ex
post implementable.
PROOF: Suppose that F is interim implementable on every T . It is a fortiori interim
implementable on the universal type space. By hypothesis, there then exists a mapping
f : T ! A such that the interim incentive compatibility condition is satis￿ed for all i
















As every type ti can be represented by a pair ti =
￿
b ￿i (ti);b ￿i (ti)
￿
, consisting of its
payo⁄ type b ￿i (ti) and its belief type b ￿i (ti), we can rewrite the incentive compatibility
condition as follows:
￿

















Based on the universal type space we can then ￿nd a message space Mi such that F is
augmented ex post implementable. Let Mi = ￿(T￿i) for all ￿i 2 ￿i and consequently let
M￿






there exists mi or equivalently ￿i such that (4.1) is satis￿ed. By hypothesis, we have
assumed implementability on the universal type space, and we can then use the fact





and for every payo⁄ type ￿i there is type ti which shares the payo⁄ type with ￿i, or
￿i = b ￿i (ti) and shares the beliefs with ￿i, or:
￿i = b ￿i (ti):
It follows that M￿ and f guarantee augmented ex post incentive compatibility of F. ￿
The notion of augmented ex post implementability is also a su¢ cient condition for
interim implementability, provided that the message space M￿ and the type space T
are ￿nite spaces.
22Proposition 4.7. If F is augmented ex post implementable with a ￿nite message space
M, then F is interim implementable on every ￿nite type space T .
PROOF. Suppose SCC F is augmented ex post implementable and ￿x an arbitrary
￿nite type space T . We show that there is an incomplete information game based on
an indirect mechanism where truth-telling is an interim equilibrium. In the incomplete
information game each agent i has to announce a payo⁄ type and a message mi 2 Mi
and thus a strategy for agent i is given by si : Ti ! ￿(M￿
i ). The outcome function g is
assumed to be identical to the selection f 2 F which guarantees augmented ex post im-
plementability by assumption. Under this indirect mechanism, consider ￿rst a restricted
game in which each agent is forced to report his payo⁄ type truthfully, or ￿i = b ￿i (ti),
but is unconstrained to report an arbitrary message mi 2 Mi. As the type space and
the message space is ￿nite, we know by standard existence arguments that the restricted
game has an interim equilibrium. Next, consider removing the restriction of truthful
reporting from agent i. By the assumption of augmented ex post implementability, we
know that for an arbitrary distribution ￿i (￿￿i;m￿i), there exists a best response un-
der which the agent reports truthfully. Thus we can remove the restriction of truthful
reporting from every agent and yet maintain the candidate strategy s￿
i : Ti ! ￿(M￿
i )
as an interim equilibrium of the unrestricted game. ￿
The ￿niteness of M￿ and T is required to guarantee the existence of an interim
equilibrium in a restricted game where each agent is forced to report his payo⁄truthfully,
but is unconstrained with respect to his choice of a message mi 2 Mi. The basic
argument for the su¢ ciency of augmented ex post implementability could be extended
to larger type and message spaces provided we can still guarantee the existence of an
interim equilibrium in the restricted game.13
5. Ex Post Equivalence for Quasi-Linear Environments
In this section we pursue the robustness of implementation problems for correspondences
in quasi-linear environments. We consider allocation problems with and without the
balanced budget requirement. The associated social choice mapping for these class of
13A weaker notion of augmented ex post implementability would require every agent i to have truth-
telling as a best response only against all distributions ￿i (m￿i) 2 ￿(M￿i) for every payo⁄ relevant
























As augmented ex post implementability implies this weaker notion, Proposition 4.6 remains intact. We
conjecture however that the converse, and hence Proposition 4.7 would not go through anymore with
this weaker notion.
23problems naturally takes the form of a correspondence as the set of permissible transfers
is not unique.
5.1. The Quasi-Linear Environment
A quasi-linear environment takes the following special form. The outcome space A is
the product of an allocation z 2 Z and transfers yi 2 R to every agent i: A = Z ￿ RI.
The utility function ui (a;￿) is additively separable, or
ui ((z;y);￿) , vi (z;￿) + yi,
for some vi : Z￿￿ ! R for each i. The social choice correspondence F￿ (￿) is composed
of a function ￿ : ￿ ! Z and arbitrary transfers y 2 RI:
F￿ (￿) , f(z;y) 2 A : z = ￿ (￿)g.
The correspondence F￿ (￿) may represent the problem of implementing an e¢ cient al-
location without requiring a balanced budget.
We ￿rst express the possibility of implementation as a set of linear constraints. The
only data of the problem that will interest us will be the incentive of a payo⁄ type to
manipulate the choice of z 2 Z by mis-reporting his payo⁄ type. His ex post gain to
reporting himself to be type ￿0
















￿ vi (￿ (￿i;￿￿i);￿). (5.1)
A set of transfer functions y = (y1;:::;yI), each yi : ￿ ! R, satisfy ex post incentive
compatibility if










for all i, ￿i, ￿0
i and ￿￿i.
Proposition 5.1. If F￿ is interim implementable on every full support common prior
naive type space T , then F￿ is ex post implementable.
PROOF. Suppose that F￿ is not ex post equilibrium implementable. Then for some i,
there does not exist yi such that for all ￿ :











i 2 ￿i. (5.2)
Consequently there exists at least one type pro￿le ￿￿i = ￿+
￿i such that no transfer
function y+






























24has a strictly negative solution, say ￿￿. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
the negative solution arises locally from the incentive constraint at ￿+
i versus ￿￿
i .
Now suppose that ￿ is interim equilibrium implementable on the naive type space
for all independent priors p 2 ￿(￿). Consequently, for every p there must exist a set
of transfers functions, y
p






































































For a given function ￿ and a given ￿ > 0, we can ￿nd " > 0 such that for all probability




















It follows that a necessary condition for interim implementation for all probability dis-
tributions p satisfying (5.4) is that there exist a transfer functions y
p




































arbitrarily close to 1, the condition (5.5) is eventually in contradiction
with the solution to the max min problem represented in (5.3). This concludes the
proof. ￿
A version of this result was reported in Bergemann and Valimaki (2002). While
the argument is again straightforward, notice that it is distinct from the argument for
Proposition 4.3. In particular, the argument for Proposition 5.1 allows the transfer
payments to depend on the prior of the agents. The outcome function is therefore
25allowed to vary with the beliefs of the agents and we do not require the same selection
of the social choice correspondence to work for all prior distributions.
We immediately also have ex post equivalence (and also equivalence for any inter-
mediate type spaces):
Proposition 5.2. F￿ is interim implementable on all type spaces if and only if F￿ is ex
post implementable.
This result shows that in the quasi-linear environment without balanced budget
requirements, concerns about the richness of the type space are misplaced. Even if
there is common knowledge of the naive type space, there is common knowledge among
the agents of the prior on that type space and the designer knows what that prior is,
implementation for every such common knowledge prior is equivalent to ex post imple-
mentation. Following Maskin (1992), a number of papers have examined ex post equi-
librium implementation for environments with interdependent types in this quasi-linear
setting.14 The current equivalence result shows that ex post equilibrium implementa-
tion is also required simply to ensure interim implementation on the naive type space
for all independent distributions over types. In the precise context of this result, the
notion of an ex post equilibrium can thus be conceived as a robustness requirement for
implementation problems embedded in a solution concept.
It is further an immediate consequence that the impossibility results in Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2001) for ex post implementation with multi-dimensional signals extend
to interim implementation when we impose robustness requirements as in the above
proposition.
5.2. The Quasi-Linear Environment with Budget Balance
The social choice problem is now augmented by requiring that the allocation z 2 Z can




(z;y) 2 A : z = ￿ (￿) and
I X
i=1
yi (￿) = 0
)
:
Our results for this environment will exploit a dual characterization of when im-
plementation is possible. Our dual approach to analyzing this problem builds on the
classic work of d￿ Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) and the more recent works of
d￿ Aspremont, Cremer and Gerard-Varet (1995, 2002). In contrast to these works who
14Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), Perry and Reny (2002), Bergemann
and Valimaki (2002).
26use the interim dual alone, we shall make use of both the ex post and the interim dual
to establish relationships between these two di⁄erent set of conditions.
The dual variables of our characterization will be the multipliers of the budget
balance constraints, ￿, and the multipliers of the incentive constraints, ￿i. In the case of
ex post incentive constraints, we say that (￿;￿), with ￿ : ￿ ! R and ￿i : ￿i￿￿i￿￿￿i !







































By contrast, in the case of interim implementation, we face a set of interim incentive
constraints on a general type space T. For ease of notation we write the beliefs of agent
i with type ti in this section as follows:
b ￿i (ti)[t￿i] , b ￿i (t￿i jti).
The interim gain of mis-reporting t0















where the underlying ex post gain of mis-reporting is de￿ned for general type spaces ,




























We then say that a set of multipliers (￿;￿), with ￿ : T ! R and ￿i : Ti ￿ Ti ! R+,












































The precise dual characterization of the balanced budget implementation problem is
given next.
27Lemma 5.3 (Dual Characterization).
1. The following are equivalent:
￿ SCC F￿ is ex post implementable;
￿ there do not exist (￿;￿) satisfying EF and EW.
2. The following are equivalent:
￿ SCC F￿ is interim implementable;
￿ there do not exist (￿;￿) satisfying IF and IW.
PROOF: See appendix. ￿
We proceed to establish equivalence between ex post and interim implementation
by using the dual conditions. We show that if either there are only two agents or,
for an arbitrary number of agents, the payo⁄ space of each agent is binary then the
equivalence between the implementation notions can be established. We show by means
of an example with three agents and three states that the conditions for equivalence are
rather tight.
The di¢ cult part in the equivalence result is to show that interim implementation
on a larger type space implies ex post implementation on the payo⁄ type space. The
proof proceeds by contrapositive in either of the two instances. We start with the
failure of ex post implementation and appeal to the dual characterization to assert the
existence of ex post multipliers which solve the ￿ ow and weight conditions. We then
seek to ￿nd interim multipliers such that the interim ￿ ow conditions are met and the
interim weight condition replicates the ex post weight condition. At ￿rst glance, this
seems di¢ cult to achieve. Notice that the ex post multipliers are de￿ned for every











. In contrast the interim multipliers for every type pair of agent i, (ti;t0
i)
have to be set without reference to the type pro￿le of the other agents, or ￿i (ti;t0
i).
But this apparent de￿cit in the ability to mimic the ex post weight condition can be
compensated by (i) a large type space Ti relative to the payo⁄ type space ￿i, and (ii)
belief types which generate either positive and equal or zero conditional probabilities.
These two features allow the interim multipliers to replicate the ex post multipliers in
a variety of circumstances.
Before we present the ￿rst result, it will be useful to record a simple fact regarding
the nature of the dual solution. The ex post ￿ ow condition:



















28requires that the net ￿ow of the incentive multipliers at every type pro￿le is equalized
across the agents. The next lemma states that if a dual solution exists it can always be
strengthened so that the gross ￿ ows at every pro￿le ￿, i.e. the in￿ ows and the out￿ ows,








































The equal gross ￿ ow property also holds for the interim dual but is not used here.
Lemma 5.4 (Equal Gross Flows).
Suppose there exists a solution (￿;￿) to the ex post dual problem, then there exists an
equal gross ￿ ow solution to the ex post dual problem.
PROOF: The proof is by construction. Consider an arbitrary ￿ where the gross ￿ ows
are not equalized across agents. It follows that there is some agent i who has the largest








































We can then create (or increase) for all j, ￿j (￿j;￿j;￿￿j) to ￿+
j (￿j;￿j;￿￿j) by setting:
￿+



















It follows that at ￿, the gross ￿ ows are now equalized and the inequality in the dual
condition remained unchanged as ￿j (￿j;￿j;￿￿j) = 0 for all ￿j and ￿￿j. Notice ￿nally
that the equalization can be performed at every ￿ independently. ￿
The critical type space for the interim implementation in the next result is the
complete information type space. We used this type space earlier in Example 3 and
describe it now in the language of this paper more precisely. Let each Ti = ￿ and hence






. We also write
￿i
￿i for the vector ￿i excluding ￿i











[t￿i] = 1. (5.10)
Thus we require that for each ￿ = (￿i;￿￿i), there is a type of agent i who has payo⁄
type ￿i and assigns probability 1 to his opponents￿having payo⁄ type pro￿le ￿￿i. The






Proposition 5.5 (Equivalence with Budget Balance: I = 2).
If I = 2, then F￿ is ex post implementable if and only if F￿ is interim implementable on
all common prior type spaces.
Since the equivalence holds for all common prior type spaces, it must also hold for
all type spaces. We will later discuss how example 3 shows that we do not also have
equivalence with interim implementation on all naive type spaces.
PROOF: Clearly, if F￿
￿ is ex post implementable then F￿
￿ is interim implementable for
all common prior type spaces. For the other direction, we argue by contrapositive.
Suppose there does not exist an ex post implementation, then we can ￿nd a solution to
the dual program with the multipliers ￿ and ￿. By Lemma 5.4 a solution for the ex post
dual has the gross ￿ ow property. Consider then the interim problem for the complete
information type space T1 = T2 = ￿. We seek to ￿nd multipliers ￿￿
i : ￿￿￿ ! R+ and
￿￿ : ￿ ! R such that the interim dual conditions (5.8) and (5.9) are met as well. For
the purpose of this proof it will be convenient to have a running counter as superscript
for the payo⁄ states of agent i as follows:

































































































We next verify that the suggested de￿nition of ￿￿ permits us to construct a solution
for the equalities (5.8) and the inequality (5.9). Consider ￿rst the equalities. Here it is
useful to distinguish between complete information types t, where ti = tj, and those t





































; for all i and j; (5.12)


































But as the gross ￿ ows are equalized in all states it follows from the existence of the
ex post dual that we can ￿nd ￿￿ (￿i￿j;￿i￿j) such that the equality holds for i and j.
Consider next types t with ti 6= tj. Here we have






, for all i (5.14)
as b ￿i (tjjti) = 0. By construction of the prior there exists only one type t0
i; namely
t0
i = tj such that b ￿i (tjjt0
i) > 0 and of course in this case it is b ￿i (tjjt0
i) = 1. Writing


















, for all i.






















































































and this completes the proof. ￿
The equivalence argument based on the complete information type space fails to
extend to I > 2 due to the very logic of the complete information type space. Suppose
we were to construct an interim dual on the basis of the complete information types.
Then there would have to exist some type pair of agent i, ti;t0
i, such that ￿i (ti;t0
i) > 0.


























Consider now a speci￿c type pro￿le (t0
i;t￿i) with ti = ￿0 and ti = tj = ￿ for all j 6= i.















This is simply because every type tj places probability 1 on all other agents to have
exactly the same type. However as only agent i has at (t0
i;t￿i) a type di⁄erent from all
other agents, there exists a type ti = ￿ such that b ￿i (t￿i jti) = 1. It follows that the ￿ ow


















32In contrast for all j 6= i, it follows from the complete information type assumption that







which obviously cannot constitute a solution to the dual.
This problem does not arise when the cardinality of the space of payo⁄ types for
each agent is at most two.
Proposition 5.6 (Equivalence with Budget Balance: #￿i ￿ 2).
If #￿i = 1 for some i or if #￿i ￿ 2 for all i, then F￿ is ex post implementable if and
only if F￿ is interim implementable on all common prior naive type spaces.
As always, we immediately also have equivalence with interim implementability on
larger type spaces.
PROOF: Clearly, if F￿ is ex post implementable then F￿ is interim implementable for
all naive type spaces. For the other direction, consider ￿rst the case of #￿i = 1. By
hypothesis F￿ is interim implementable on all naive type spaces, and thus a fortiori
F￿ is interim implementable as well. By Proposition 5.2 it follows that F￿ is ex-post
implementable. We then consider the ex post implementation solution of F￿ without a
balanced budget and modify if necessary the transfers of agent i with #￿i = 1, say it is
i = 1, to achieve budget balance. It su¢ ces to have the transfer of agent 1 absorb the
de￿cit or surplus of the remaining agents by letting




By hypothesis there are no incentive constraints to respect for agent 1 and such a
modi￿cation is always feasible.
For the case of #￿i = 2 for all i, we shall analyze the implementation problem in its
dual version and argue again by contrapositive. Suppose that ex post implementation
is not feasible and by Lemma 5.3 there exist a solution (v;￿) to the ex post ￿ ow and
weighting conditions. We ￿nd appropriate values for the interim dual variables, denoted
by (v￿;￿￿), together with a prior p on the naive type space, i.e. Ti = ￿i to obtain a
solution to the interim dual (5.8) and (5.9). Thus ￿x the ex post variables (v;￿) and
















Since #￿i = 2, ￿0
i is uniquely de￿ned given ￿i and ￿0
i 6= ￿i. By hypothesis, the multipliers











which guarantees that the prior p(￿) is well de￿ned. The associated interim belief is
given by
























Otherwise we can, without loss of generality, set






















v￿ (￿) , v (￿), (5.17)
for all i;￿i;￿0
























































































￿ > 0, (5.19)
for all i;￿i;￿0
i and ￿. After eliminating the denominator in (5.18) and (5.19), respectively,
through the obvious cancellations, the above interim dual conditions coincide with the
ex post dual conditions (5.6) and (5.7). ￿
34The argument of the proof suggests an algorithm for constructing a prior over the
naive type space. The prior displays correlation, but agent i with payo⁄ type ￿i now
assigns equal probability to 2I￿1 possible payo⁄ pro￿les of the remaining agent. The
derived posterior has the further property that for every type pro￿le ￿, there exist some
￿0






> 0 and thus evades the problem which arose in the complete
information type space with many agents.
We conclude this section by discussing two examples illustrating the role of the
assumptions in Proposition 5.5 and 5.6.
Recall that in Example 3, ex post implementation was not possible, interim im-
plementation on all naive type spaces was possible, but interim implementation on all
common prior type spaces was not possible. Recall that the naming of the allocation
represented a ￿xed transfer of utility from one agent to the other agent. If arbitrary
transfers of utility were allowed instead, the results would be unchanged: the transfers
turn out to irrelevant in establishing the impossibility results and the positive results
automatically go through if more instruments are allowed. This expanded version of
Example 3 establishes that it is not possible to strengthen Proposition 5.5 to show the
equivalence of ex post implementation and interim implementation on naive type spaces.
We already saw in Examples 1 and 2 examples where ex post implementation is im-
possible but interim implementation is possible on all type spaces. In order to establish
the same conclusion in a quasi-linear environment, Propositions 5.5 and 5.6 show that
the example must be somewhat complicated. Example 4 below represents a minimal
departure from the assumptions in Propositions 5.5 and 5.6. It features three agents
in which the ￿rst agent has a payo⁄ type space of cardinality three, whereas the re-
maining two agents have binary payo⁄ state spaces. We show in this example that ex
post implementation is not possible but that interim implementation is possible on any
type space. The example points to a failure of the equivalence results with a minimal
relaxation of either one of the two distinct sets of su¢ cient conditions.























The social choice function is de￿ned over three allocations A = fa;b;cg and represented

















































































where " > 0. This example has the feature that the social choice function and the



















Moreover, social choice function and payo⁄s remain symmetric for agent 2 and 3 on the
entire domain. In the absence of monetary transfer (i.e. zero transfers in all states) each
agent i has exactly one pro￿table ex post deviation at every state ￿￿i: either by mis-
reporting ￿+
i instead of truth-telling ￿￿
i or mis-reporting ￿￿
i instead of truthtelling ￿+
i .
The only exception arises for agent 1 in the state ￿+
2 ￿+
3 , where it is not ex post pro￿table
to misreport ￿￿
1 instead of truthtelling ￿+
1 , but where it is pro￿table to misreport ￿0
1
instead of truthtelling ￿+
1 and to misreport ￿￿
1 instead of truthtelling ￿0
1.
The example on the symmetric and restricted domain does not satisfy ex post imple-
mentability and by Proposition 5.6 it then also fails to be interim implementable. The
introduction of the additional state ￿0
1 together with the replacement of the pro￿table








1 by the two pro￿table
deviations ￿+
1 to ￿0
1 and from ￿1 to ￿0
1 leaves ex post implementation impossible, but
opens the possibility for interim implementation.
We ￿rst verify the failure of ex post implementation by considering all states ￿ where
the gains from deviating in terms of the gross payo⁄s are ". The transfers yi (￿) in these






































































































































































































We can now appeal to the balanced budget condition and observe that the sum of the
left hand sides in the above inequalities is zero. This obviously leads to a contradiction
with the right hand side which is positive. Thus ex post implementation is impossible.
We now show that interim implementation is possible on any type space. Consider
the following indirect mechanism in which agent one sends a message besides his payo⁄
type. Thus the message spaces are de￿ned by M1 = ￿1 ￿ f0;1g, with typical element
m1 = (￿1;￿); M2 = ￿2; and M3 = ￿3. If message pro￿le ((￿1;￿);￿2;￿3) is sent,



























































￿a + b;a;￿b ￿2a;a;a
(5.21)
We assume that the parameters of the transfer payments satisfy the following conditions:
a ￿ b ￿ 1 ￿ c > " > 0. (5.22)
Call the resulting mechanism G and ￿x any type space T . We will argue that there












, if b  1 (t1) = 2 b ￿
s2 (t2) = b ￿2 (t2)
s3 (t3) = b ￿3 (t3)
where b ￿ is a subset of ￿(￿2 ￿ ￿3) . We recall that b  i (ti) was de￿ned in (2.1) as the
belief of type ti of agent i over the payo⁄ types of the remaining agents.
The transfer payments suggested in the tables (5.20) and (5.21) together with the
restrictions (5.22) have the following incentive properties. The incentive constraints
for agents 2 and 3 are satis￿ed ex-post for all types and all reports by agent 1. In
contrast, the ex-post incentive constraints for agent 1 are satis￿ed only partially. For














now use these local properties to guarantee interim incentive compatibility for agent
1 by inducing him to choose ￿ appropriately. The large rewards and penalties o⁄ered
through a and b will induce him to the send the message ￿ = 1 if and only if he assigns







, otherwise he will have a preference to report ￿ = 0 in order to avoid







We begin with the ex-post incentive constraints for agent 2, which are given by:











We ￿rst observe that the di⁄erential transfer implications of mis-reporting for agent 2,
namely





; ￿2 6= ￿0
2
























































































2 is the only message di⁄erent from ￿+






, is represented in the next table. By the binary nature of the state space,







































Since " < c ￿ 1, it follows that the transfer gain from telling the truth always outweighs
(ex post) the allocative gain from mis-reporting. As the ex post incentive constraints
are satis￿ed, it is a fortiori true for the interim constraints. The suggested transfers
maintain symmetry between agent 2 and 3 and hence the ex post incentive constraints
are satis￿ed for agent 3 as well.
We next verify the interim incentive conditions for agent 1. We do this in three
steps. First we identify su¢ cient conditions for agent 1 to report either ￿ = 0 or ￿ = 1.
Second, we examine the truthtelling conditions for agent 1 given his choice of ￿. Third,
we ￿nd joint conditions on a;b;c and " such that truthtelling is satis￿ed after removing
the conditioning on the choice of ￿.
In the ￿rst step, we assume that 1, c and " are all in￿nitesimal compared with a and






. Ignoring in￿nitesimal terms
and assuming that all other agents report truthfully, we observe that agent￿ s payo⁄ to
setting ￿ = 1 is at least
p(2b) + (1 ￿ p)(￿2a) = 2p(a + b) ￿ 2a
39and is at most
p(2b) + (1 ￿ p)(￿a + b) = p(a + b) ￿ (a ￿ b),
where the bounds are obtained by varying the remaining probability 1￿p over the other














agent 1 will certainly set ￿ = 0.
In second step, we ￿x the choice of ￿ and ask whether agent 1 will truthfully report
his payo⁄ type. Thus suppose that agent 1 sets ￿ = 0. The only ex post pro￿table
misrepresentations are for type ￿+
1 to claim to be ￿0
1 and for type ￿0








. In each case the allocative gain to lying is " and otherwise it
is ￿1. The gain in additional transfers from lying is at most 6c across all states, and
thus a su¢ cient condition for no mis-reporting is




Finally, suppose that agent 1 will set ￿ = 1. We recall that the ex-post constraints






and hence the interim
constraints will be satis￿ed for p in the neighborhood of 1. In particular, the gain from






, is at least 2c ￿ ". On the other hand, the






is at most " + 5c. So interim constraints are
satis￿ed as long as




We can now choose a and b su¢ ciently large and c and " su¢ ciently small (say " = 1
100,
c = 1













while preserving the inequalities (5.22). The inequalities in (5.24) allow us conclude
that whenever ￿ = 0 or ￿ = 1 could conceivably be a best response, then reporting the
payo⁄type truthfully is a best response as well. To see this, observe that if agent 1 ever










so he will truthfully report his payo⁄ type. On the other hand, if agent 1 ever sets










and thus agent 1 will again truthfully report his payo⁄ type.
6. Interim Implementability on Arbitrary Type Spaces
In the special but important case of the quasi-linear environment from the previous
section (without budget balance constraints), we establish a precise characterization of
when interim implementation is possible for an arbitrary (￿nite) type space. Given risk
neutral types, it is always possible to identify an agent￿ s belief type via a set of bets, as
suggested by d￿ Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) and Myerson (1981), for example
using a quadratic objective function. So the implementation problem reduces to ￿nding
transfers to distinguish the payo⁄ types that are possible for a given belief type. Thus
the characterization of interim implementability reduces to the type of conditions that
would arise looking at implementation with independent types on the naive type space.
After our main result, we provide a discussion of these conditions and how reasonable
they are.
Our results follow an argument of Neeman (2001) concerning a revenue maximizing
seller of a single object. Neeman noted that the full surplus extraction result of Cremer
and McLean (1985) breaks down if we make the reasonable assumption that many
payo⁄ types are consistent with a given belief type. However, in that setting, one
cannot assume that even the belief type is fully extracted, since there may be rents
associated with beliefs of linearly dependent types (see Parreiras (2002)). However,
when a planner does not care about transfers, belief types can be fully extracted giving
an exact characterization.
To state our results, we use some conditions for implementation on the naive type
space. Suppose it was common knowledge that agent i believed that others￿payo⁄types



















41as agent i￿ s expected utility from allocation rule ￿ given that he has beliefs  i over his
opponent￿ s payo⁄ type, he has payo⁄ type ￿i, he reports himself to have payo⁄ type ￿0
i,
and he expects the social planner to behave as if there is truth-telling. Suppose further
that the planner knew that agent i￿ s type was an element of ￿i ￿ ￿i. The incentive
constraints for individual i in this case become:
De￿nition 6.1. Types ￿i are said to be  i￿incentive compatible if there exists y :
￿i ! R such that










for all ￿i, ￿0
i 2 ￿i.
Thus if there were two agents with independent beliefs ( 1; 2) over each others￿
types, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for interim implementation in this case would
be that types ￿i are  i￿incentive compatible. We will show that interim implemen-
tation on an arbitrary type space reduces to a collection of such conditions. For any
beliefs ￿i over other agents￿types, the corresponding beliefs over other agents￿payo⁄
types are:





i be the collection of all possible belief types (i.e., the range of b ￿i (￿)); and let
e ￿i (￿i) be the collection of payo⁄ types consistent with ￿i, i.e.,
e ￿i (￿i) ,
n
￿i : b ￿i (ti) = ￿i and b ￿i (ti) = ￿i for some ti
o
.
Proposition 6.2 (Interim Implementation). F￿ is interim implementable if and
only if for each i and ￿i 2 ￿￿
i, types e ￿i (￿i) are e  i (￿i)- incentive compatible.
Proof. (Necessity). Suppose that F￿ is interim implementable and let yi : T ! R be
the transfer function for i in the direct truth-telling mechanism. De￿ne e yi : Ti￿￿￿
i ! R
by




Thus e yi (ti;￿i) is the expected transfer to agent i if he reports himself to be type ti and
his belief type is ￿i. Now observe that the payo⁄ to type ti of agent i reporting himself












































42Now incentive compatibility requires that ￿i (ti;ti) ￿ ￿i (ti;t0
i) for all ti;t0
i 2 Ti. This
implies that if b ￿i (ti) = b ￿i (t0
i) and b ￿i (ti) = b ￿i (t0
i) = ￿i, then






So e yi (t0








for the expected transfer to a type of agent i whose true belief over the
opponent￿ s type is ￿i, but who reports himself to be a type with belief ￿0
i and payo⁄
type ￿0


































Now if ￿i, ￿0
i 2 e ￿i (￿i), this implies
b vi
￿
￿i;￿i; e  i (￿i)
￿
+ b yi (￿i;￿i;￿i) ￿ b vi
￿
￿i;￿0









y (￿i) = b yi (￿i;￿i;￿i),
we must have that types e ￿i (￿i) are e  i (￿i)- incentive compatible.
(Su¢ ciency) Suppose that there for each i and ￿i 2 ￿￿
i, types e ￿i (￿i) are e  i (￿i)-
incentive compatible. Then there exists y￿
i : ￿i ￿ ￿￿
i ! R satisfying
b vi
￿
￿i;￿i; e  i (￿i)
￿
+ b yi (￿i;￿i;) ￿ b vi
￿
￿i;￿0








for all ￿i, ￿0






























For each i, let
hi (t￿i;￿i) = ￿
2










































yi (t) = y￿
i
￿





hi (t￿i;b ￿i (ti)):
Now if agent i is a type ti with b ￿i (ti) = ￿i and b ￿i (ti) = ￿i, and he reports himself to
be a type t0
i with b ￿i (t0
i) = ￿0
i and b ￿i (t0
i) = ￿0























If he tells the truth, his payo⁄ is
b vi
￿




























￿i;￿i; e  i (￿i)
￿
+ y￿
i (￿i;￿i) ￿ b vi
￿
￿i;￿0














i 6= ￿i, the ￿rst term is strictly greater than K (by (6.4)) and the second term is
less than or equal to K (by (6.2)), so the inequality holds. If ￿i = ￿0
i, the ￿rst term is
zero and the second term holds by (6.1). ￿
The ￿only if￿ part of the result will continue to hold if there are an in￿nite set
of types. For the ￿if￿type, one could try to deal with in￿nite type spaces using the
techniques of McAfee and Reny (1992), although one would probably require additional
structure on the in￿nite type space. The result is sensitive to the assumptions of risk
neutrality and no limited liability constraints (Robert (1991) made this argument in a
￿xed type space setting). But the key question is whether it is reasonable to assume
that there are many possible belief types for each payo⁄ type. We now discuss this
issue.
Neeman (2001) emphasized that a key property in the surplus extraction results of
Cremer and McLean (1985) is the following:











= b ￿i (ti):
44This property implies that if the mechanism designer can ￿nd out the beliefs of a
agent about other agent￿ s types, then the mechanism designer can deduce his payo⁄
type. If the one-to-one property holds, then the condition of Proposition 6.2 hold
vacuously. A traditional justi￿cation for this assumption is that if we ￿xed a ￿nite type
space, and picked a generic common prior, and derived agents￿beliefs from the common
prior, the one-to-one property would automatically hold. However, it is unclear what
this thought experiment is supposed to prove. What does it mean to assume that the
set of possible types is common knowledge (already a very strong assumption), and then
maintain common knowledge of the common prior even as the common prior is varied?
It is more natural to ask if the one-to-one property is satis￿ed on large state spaces that
relax common knowledge assumptions. In fact, the following very di⁄erent property will
hold on su¢ ciently rich type spaces.
De￿nition 6.4. Type space T satis￿es the product property if for all ￿i 2 ￿i and
￿i 2 ￿(T￿i) in the range of b ￿i, there exists ti 2 Ti such that
b ￿i (ti) = ￿i and b ￿i (ti) = ￿i.
This property holds by construction on the universal type space (or the union of all
possible type spaces). It seems like a natural property to assume when one does not
want to make strong common knowledge assumptions about the players￿higher order
beliefs.15 If one makes this assumption, Proposition 6.2 tells us the non-trivial incentive
constraints that must then be satis￿ed.16
Further insight into the one-to-one and product properties can be obtained by re-
stricting attention to the case where the common prior assumption holds. Under the
common prior assumption, all type spaces have a certain conditional independence prop-
erty of the prior (this was noted in Lemma 2 in Neeman (2001)). For simplicity, we
state the result for ￿nite type spaces, but this result should extend straightforwardly to
arbitrary type spaces. Let ￿i and ￿ be the range of ^ ￿i (￿) and ^ ￿ (￿), respectively.
15While the product property holds automatically on the universal type space, it would be interesting
to explore when it holds, or holds "typically", on large subsets of the universal type space where some
common knowledge assumptions (e.g., the common prior assumption) are built in. Such an exercise is
beyond the scope of this paper. In particular, it requires a notion of genericity for the universal type
space. While the standard approach (￿x types, vary the common knowledge common prior) is clearly
￿ awed, it is not obvious what alternative to use (see Morris (2002) for a discussion of this issue).
16McLean and Postlewaite (2001) discuss an interesting environment where e¢ cient implementation
is possible even though the one-to-one property fails. The key to their results is that the payo⁄ type
information that cannot be extracted from belief types is exclusively private value information, and
standard Vickrey auction arguments can be used to deal with this residual incentive problem.
45Lemma 6.5 (Conditional Independence).
If T is a ￿nite type space with a common prior p(￿), then there exists ￿ 2 ￿(￿) and,
for each i, ￿i : ￿i ! ￿(￿i), such that
X
ft2T:b ￿(t)=￿ and b ￿(t)=￿g
p(t) = ￿ (￿)
I Y
i=1
￿i (￿i j￿i): (6.5)
Proof. Write ￿i (￿i jt￿i;￿i) for the probability that agent i has payo⁄ type ￿i, con-








































We notice that by the de￿nition of belief type:
p(t￿i j￿i;￿i) = ￿i (t￿i),
for all ￿i and t￿i. So


















































￿i (￿i j￿i) ￿ p(￿ij￿i);
we obtain the representation given in (6.5). ￿
Now observe that condition (6.5) is trivially satis￿ed if the one-to-one property holds
(since, for each ￿i, there is a unique possible ￿i). The Lemma shows that if the one-to-one
property fails, it must nonetheless be the case that a conditional independence property
holds (in a non-trivial way) when agents￿types are represented as the product of payo⁄
and belief types. Just as independence is natural in some economic environments, we
can tell stories why non-trivial conditional independence might arise naturally. Two
that have been suggested are the following:
1. Suppose that agents￿valuations of an object include a common value component
and an idiosyncratic component, and agents observe a noisy signal of their com-
mon value component. Assuming that their idiosyncratic value components are
independent, their valuations will be correlated but their signal about the com-
mon value component will be a su¢ cient statistic for an agent￿ s beliefs about his
opponent￿ s type and will be the ￿belief type￿in our language. Thus the charac-
terization of Lemma 6.5 holds despite a failure of the one-to-one property. In fact,
the product property will hold in this example. McLean and Postlewaite￿ s (2001)
analysis of e¢ cient auction design with multidimensional types is an example
where the one-to-one property is dropped but correlation of types is maintained,
using this common value / idiosyncratic value motivation.
2. Suppose that agents are uncertain about the accuracy of each agent￿ s signal. Thus
an agent￿ s type includes a parameter describing the accuracy of his signal and also
the actual signal observed. Parreiras (2002) shows that this natural story leads
to non-trivial conditional independence, and thus a breakdown of the one-to-one
property.
477. Conclusion
This paper considered the robustness of general implementation problems. We formal-
ized a notion of robustness by requiring interim implementation to be successful for
large type spaces. We introduced successively richer type spaces, starting with the
naive type all the way to the universal type space to represent strategic uncertainty.
We investigated the idea that ex post equilibrium implementation is actually required if
we were to demand interim implementation on large type spaces, such as the universal
type space. An exact equivalence result between ex post equilibrium on the naive type
space and interim implementation on common prior type spaces was shown to hold for
many important implementation problems, such as social choice functions in general
environments or e¢ cient implementation in quasi-linear environments.
The exact equivalence did not extend to all social choice environments and we pre-
sented examples of correspondences (with and without transferable utility) in which the
disparity between the ex post and interim implementation notions became apparent. In
response to this gap, we suggested the notion of augmented ex post implementation to
obtain a general equivalence result. Clearly, further research may yet identify necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for general social choice environments without the augmented
notion of ex post implementability.
The current results merely represent some initial steps to spell out how far the re-
quirements of common knowledge can be weakened in the pursuit of mechanism design
solutions. In this paper, we considered social choice problems where the payo⁄ states
did not include the beliefs of the agents or the designer. Yet, in many design problems,
such as revenue maximizing auctions, the beliefs of the agents are clearly payo⁄relevant
for the designer. It would be interesting to identify settings where even if the designer
knew that the payo⁄ types were correlated according to a particular distribution, ex
post equilibrium implementation would be required to implement on richer type spaces
consistent with that belief. This paper looked at partial (i.e., truthful / incentive com-
patible) implementation. In a companion paper we use the current framework to look at
weak implementation and full implementation. In addition, in settings where we have
a common prior over a type space or a subset thereof, we would like to consider the
robustness of virtual implementation (Abreu and Matsushima (1992)) where we only
require implementation with high ex ante probability (rather than for every possible
type).
Finally, the introduction of large types spaces, naturally leads to the question as to
whether single crossing properties on the naive type space have analogue properties on
larger type spaces. For example, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) identify a single crossing
property that is su¢ cient for e¢ cient ex post equilibrium implementation. In their
leading example, they consider a two agent case where agent 1 observes a signal ￿1,
agent 2 observes a signal ￿2 and their valuations of an object are v1 = a￿1 + ￿2 and
48v2 = a￿2 + ￿1, respectively. Their single crossing su¢ cient condition in this example
is that a ￿ 1. We would like to examine the analogue to this property on larger type
spaces. Their are at two ways of doing this. One is to take the signals ￿1 and ￿2 as the
payo⁄-types in our larger type space constructions. But it is also natural to ask what
would happen if we took agents￿valuations to be their payo⁄-types in our construction.
Now to capture the signal approach of Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), we would need
to impose common knowledge restrictions on agents￿beliefs about valuations. In their
leading example, it is (implicitly) assumed that agent 1 knows for certain the value




￿1). Just as a recent literature has tried
to understand the meaning of the common prior assumption when expressed in the
language of agents￿higher order beliefs in the universal types space (see, e.g., Feinberg
(2000)), we can also try and express implementability conditions in terms of agents￿
higher order beliefs about valuations. This would represent a further step to make the
￿Wilson doctrine￿ , which prefaced this paper, precise and operational.
498. Appendix
PROOF of Lemma 5.3: Suppose initially that condition (1:) holds but (2:) is false. Then
there exist y1;::::;yI, each yi : ￿ ! R satisfying ex post incentive compatibility











for all i, ￿i, ￿0
i and ￿￿i and budget balance
I X
i=1
yi (￿i;￿￿i) = 0; (8.2)
and there exist ￿ : ￿ ! R, and ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿I), each ￿i : ￿2

















































































































yi (￿i;￿￿i) = 0;






















To show that (2:) implies (1:), we appeal to the following version of Farkas￿Lemma
and a Corollary.
Lemma 8.1 (Farkas￿Lemma).





















for all j = J0 + 1;::::;J if and if there does not exist ￿ 2 RJ such that
￿j ￿ 0;








The interim dual characterization is established by the same argument, appropriately
modi￿ed, as the ex post dual characterization. ￿
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